Manned Spacecraft Center Viewpoints on Reliability and Quality Control by Gilruth, R. R. & Bailey, F. J.
.. .. ; 
• .. '" . ' f 
( ___ ", ~. -.1 , . '( IV 11 s II- Address given by Dr. Robert R • . 
'-"""'"-a L£tA-M'-' Ii-~ GILRUTH at the Aircraft Ind ' fh.~,Q ~CJL..CA.~f' '..J Assoe~ Quality Control Com-
~, ~N 6' 4 ' 10 1 1 OdJ> ~Dinner in Houston on Nove~r IS, 1962. 
£-/ 
CO~ T OL:.': , 11<-
,1'"" r:.~mI:D SPACECRAF,r CENTER vi c..VPOINTS ON RELIABILITY .AND QUAL! 0 
. p; ~. 6~ ~ ~,~. M~ ( lVjI5/1- 17?JX - O/613 tJ 
L )..J " \ ~ l) + '-1 f;, ::£-~ tt:r Tne quali'''Y control requiI\e nents and procedures that are being 
O,~ i k- devcloped for manned spacecraft :tiffer in a number of important re-
(]J.AV\-" . ~~" V SPcc···s froTa the conventional pra~tices that have evolved in previous 
d-~ aircraft and missile programs. "fhcse differences are a natural con-
v -Y."J/ scqucr.ce of SOIre of the distinct lve featnres of manned space flight C;;;; I pl"G",,_'J.r'1'i§ ai1u vd it21@§ a 
/' f)~ point ouJc a fet'>] of these distinc ::ive features and their effect on 
I " 
, I) l~lo"V'l~eliabili~ and quality control .:>equirements. 
N('(' I , '" Tl e J.TIost outstanding featur: ! of our programs is their research 
r;."'" 
character . The flight missions 1 )eing undertaken in the manned ex-
l?loratio,n of spaee are in every : :ense of the word research flights. 
They are a search for knowledgl~. not only of space itself, but o.lso 
,on hmv to survive, travel, and mrncuver in space; to take off and 
land spacecraft on the earth, thE moon, and eventually the planets. 
'l'he spacecraft we \lse are s .. ngle -purpose devices, few in num-
b Cl";! 1:o,ilot";!!!d sp~~cifically to ea( h particular mission. Once the 
miosion for t",hich they arc dcs.:gr cd has been accomplish,ed, they are 
lmlfl<cly t o cntcr a production prase or enjoy a long period of 
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our quality con-::-rol probl.ems are much closer to thosa of the X-15 
i:.1U>i. to tho:JG qf the B - 58 . 
F'0l'" those -c -J pioneeri:ng S )acccraft "'lC must obta:I.n parts t com-
}?O:1C.iTi:S 1> stibsyctcms, and engincc :-ing us ncar to pc rfeotion as the 
~\l-don T s finest craftz~l1 C<ll1 nco deve . 
LlC single-purpose charact~r of OU2~ sp~cecraft is not exactly 
of ou~'t mm chobsing. No.t .. ure has perversely laid out the stepping 
atoneD to spacq in such a t'1ay as to require a substantial advance 
1..1 ;?:;,opt!lsion capability bet'we2n each s tep. An UI'gent need for 
~angible evidence of progress in space impells us to attempt cacll 
!}tcp as soon as the roLtrlmum calla] d.li1.-y can be achieved. Because 
'1,IC n:Q tm:dc" 01'1 (Y Duccoosive Hili ,siono a :t' pidly as pO$oihlc~ 
Ol~,;".ys nt 1:he extreme o~ter limi~ : of our lldvuncir~ propulsion capa-
bility) 'the Bvc.cccraft we use oro rightly weight limited. They OWl 
never be In~ov.:i.dcd with t:he grmrtl. potential that would allow them 
to be .::.dapted to ::mcca:~din..-:; step!. Nor can the experienced engineer-
.:mt; team cOn[llcting the crucial ;i inal fliz]1t stages of one program 
be safely divc~tcd from its ta3k to undertake thc design of the vc-
11ic10. hus, we must progress b~ a series of more or less ind.e-
per.dent pi"Ogrrur.3 , cacl of i.'TlCI'CU! ing size and comple,d ty , over-
l:ll?pi~ in ti.m, a..""1d r:mmed by cU fferent independent teams of govern-
~~1t and contrnctol engincers t e~ch having little if any first-hand 





,a.v.:!ilnllle at th~ time t he Pl'Ogl'Q . starts . Tnis situation o.bviously 
~alls :for s·L"1."ong emphasis or I'c:tp ~d dissemination of operational 
thl."'Oughout the entire ma.nnge-
!i12lTt" cngineerL>g, indU:Stria.l~ a ld a-ducational complex. No ma.tter 
h.;.~~ hc.rd ue t'1ork on this app!'oae: l ~ hm"lever» t>Je cannot hope to achieve 
pc::'feccion . Some design dccisio' oS "l7i11 still be mo.de in ignorance 
ef il~o:';:u:ttion that eXists , and '}t~lers will be shown t<lrong by infor-
mation yet to be acquired . TheSl ~ errors will have to be cor~ted 
bcZo_"'C l:light. 'rhus we arrivQ a: what is perhaps the most impor-
~a."'l"t single rcquirc1r.2nt in our p ,'Ograms; th<lt designs, pracedUr-es, 
ru .... d :Jcheaulcw must have:! the fl'!X.~bilitv to absol"b a steady stream 
of c: 1~(~5 f'"(;!nGratcd by n cantin ",",lly increasing understanding of 
GO)\. cc nl"'o'!Jlcms .. Reliability, ,:.!Utlity con't rol., ~.ufacturingt and 
p;:'OCU1..~c . .mt plcr..s nuwt 0.11 be se": up with full ~cognition of this 
rcqtrircP'!Cl1t for continual' hard:1a" 'e change .. 
The rIm", of new informatio: ~ from current space programs is not 
the only SOUl:.~cC of requirement,s ~ 'or' chungc .. Equipment rnalfWlctions 
tl nt occur durin;.,; system developi lent testing or prefllgh", prepa.ra-
tiOTIS Cll"e often of equal. or g:t':!a' :e.r importance. In marmcd flight 
\JC ~Ul-mot afford to regro: d uny 0: these equipmel1t malfunctions OS 
a.' "n.."ldom fnilure . t'le must rcg,ll'd every malfunction and, in fact, 
_V21."'Y observed pcculit:;rity in thc ' behnvior of a system as an impor-
t:cnt wi:li.""±1ing of potential. disast '1' . Only t-J'hcn the cause is thorough-
, 1;/ understood, ruld a chango to e . .iminatc it has been mnde , can we 
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..!.he ,Probler.1 here is one c:f shortening the failure dc:-~ec"'don---
C01"_~,-c·tive c 'cion cycle -to e.l:L"!1: nate disastrous cf...:ccts on ope~~:ting 
~$"~-:'h2Y-U rrcticn seldorx i tattQ until a fnilurc has been rc-
p~atcd ut l~ast enough tin~s to acct~~ate a noticeable pile of 
:mI curf:..C; and where the subsC!Clt. ent paper-lined path from prirr.e 
ccnt_~o.c-J::or~ to suhcontractbr~ -tc parts vendor, and bnck~ too often 
produces little but aclay '> co~;-=, ~'1d- dJ.sclailrers of responsihili t:y. 
RGn:td corrective respons€.....J? malftmctions throup;hotrt sys-tern 
dcvC!lo?r.:2nt- u.nd prefli~!ht prer ar 1 ions is a critically importo..i1t 
rccnli:'X!mcn-t, of our programs if \.; ~ are to meet schedulcs with hard-
\J~!'~C t:hut io fit to fly . To the maximum extent possible) failure 
~n~lY8i~ and decisions ac to cor~Qctive nction must take place im-
m~dia'tc,ly at the scene of. the fa' ure, where the availability of 
-i:h2 part) the test set- up, and t: If.! people involved in the test ~ 
o[Zers the b~8t opportunity for lccurate determination of the perti-
n~nt fact!> . Contracts and purch. sc agreements '(>lith cOrr?p{)nent and 
1'::1r-1:s suppliers should provide tJ mt the services of their cngmeer-
ing ~:rtaffo vIiIl be avniloJ;>le on I!all ,(-Jhencvor r quircd for this 
rJt.~r:D0se. Conctl'llctive and cff~c- :ive reaction to- the Cl'rergency situ-
~tiOl crca.t8d \J.1en a failure r(~ tires redesign of a spacecraft com-
ponent is tr_c I. 05t welcome con-tr: bution an individual or company 
C2..TI r:1Clke to -C!1C~ nation's space Pl ogrc:uns. 
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lmot .cr distinctive cha.1:':lc .:cristic of our spacecraft is the 
l2.rge 'rru..~)(~ ~~ of onc-s"ot and l.iJ lited- life items used in the various 
CUDS 13'tc..".i3. This cha.rac ..... eristi.~ limits the runOlmt of proof testing 
':10:1: CQ.."1 be pcr'£ol"'In2d on the :lC' :t111 flight articles . In the case 
of i'tel. S such as th.:a hc~a:t shi::llt, I escape rocket's, explosive separa-
tiOTI ,"cvices ~ e~{plos':'ve disco:1l1( cts) igniters, etc., b'le aetunl 
specimen to be flmm -C<1Th"1ot be ested at alL Itams such as fuel 
cello ~ u!:>lative nozzles) paraehl :i:es) and la.unch vehicle engi''''1es 
co.n b0 C'ven only limited. tes'cs ! under conditiol1$ thnt n~ not 
tl'uly cpr'Cocmta"'dve, and then (nly at considerable ~"is1< that the 
"CCS'CS ffi1d their .aftermath may ir troduce more flight failures than 
they prevent. This particular :r roblcm is of co~c shared by the 
DG.llistic missile but not by t:he airplo.Jle • 
... 1~ opcratine philosophy tl'lt has evolved to meet the situation 
is based on the idetl th:lt ra."1c.orr ty selected srunples of components 
can be cubjected~ in a so-called 'qualification test progrrun, to 
.co nplctc confiCi.cncc that the res tits of these tests will apply to 
't:1C l'~n::tining ut'-'dclcs illStc.llcd in the fligt'l1: vehicles. This 
ccrIidencc is not justified unlcl8 all supposedly identical parts 
fl~ ;; ';:ihic~1 th~ components ;).r-e l:; ~embled are truly identical in nIl 
e::;sendal fcatl"Os. Although t'l1i; pa ts Cfu."'l be inapccted und their 
p::-k ~ y cnt1racte.l'iatics can be m,', .:.uJ."'ed, identity in the sense re-
quil'ed .JY the qu.n.lific<J:!:ion tc~~,t philosophy cannot be fully estnb-
~~ 
lis!1Q;:l by i..11~_,cction and ~asu:('er ..ent: alone . eatums thu'c ev~nt:tlally 
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tttl"'J1 ·.:mt to ba important i11, gov 1rlUl1u s":ns:ttivity -to ~.l1"1iror.r.:ant 
---0:2 .;3u£~cp-l-jbility to fc..1.1ur-e o ... :en ai:'C unrecogniZt-:d or inadequa'i:cly 
To ut.L,ieve 0. degree of con : ::"01 over wha-tever unknml/Il or indc-
-::C' 'old.Dilt"! influa.11.ccs may ~ iot? consideration must b::! givC.l .. to the 
nc~e38ity 
. . 
-th:tt all r O:!,:'J:)!l(:'l:l'tc .= "11L.ring ceI'i;-1':"-tcH·tion tIE'ou,;-;-... a 
_ ............ I_~"!,"_-';'-"'--'- -
~,-==.::.:;:.;...;;==;.;;;:..-'O.=..:::.. ... p ... r::..;;:o""fITJ.:.:I';..;~c;;:;m;;.;.-...;;b;..;;c::..-;r:1;.:.;.- ~~c u~ ~t~. 'l~~~ -. 
be C'!Gntl'ollcd to hold enviro:n;nelltal stresses 'Nell within the limits 
io ul:::o ... cce:::so.ry thnt t1 e pa1;'b l b -fd,entified individunlly or as 
J.,2rnDcr:; of the set a."ld tha'i: recl ,rds shm'l the location of all parts 
in n .set. 
This rcquiremGnt for idrnlt:fication of parts _ . .,. -~ of critical 
ir..port:J.l'!CC t'.71Cn{?Ver fu1lme 0.7 l component under test reveals a 
defec';: in a pari: 'idrlch ean be '1 tributed to the design or to the 
nnnuEac'cll_ing or hru1dling J?roLe~ s . It then becomes essentia:}. to 
lor~a:tc lli'1 remove ~diat:ely £10'ill all flight cOnlpOllcnts all similar 
Si."1CC theca parts inny h;: ve been u..,eu in more tlt.nn ·the one 
~.Ji)C of COl:,9o:1.cnt that l"cvealc:d the deficiency, it is not sufficient 
mc:"cly ·to :"C:i,OVC ~11 of that 1:yI e of component . The very strict 
control ovc ...... p\.~rts ident~fiea ':1(. n and use that \.;e are seeking is 








8 rc .. ,cli_y located for rcr.1Oval dnd replaccnr-nt . 
:n 'i:l e a:!:'ca. of insPQct:i.o:n.~ flight safety considerations cmd. 
. ·.1~ l~"L:"'::;d number of nr·ticles : .Lvolved in our programs nmJ.{e it 
reasc:a ..... blc to rcquir~ 100 per CI ~r:.t inspection of all i terns. In-
spection.prcc·~ll-nos must be d~s:&ned to loeat~ und reject every 
{'!.ci"cc:!.:iv2 or ooreinnl purt t no 1 att r hO\'J many good parts are ll.'1-
r:.8ccss,:rily rejected in tne p::'O( ess e vIe arc not alone in t lis mut-
'tel." of cxt:rcm~ seleetivi:ty in tl e acceptance of pur~-s for ~pace-
c~aft. · :' the outstundingly !Ju(cess<:'ul '1'clesi:ar sntellite 58,800 
Cll..:·CQI>t~lc solid s'tate devices ~ ere exnmined ·to select the 22~500 
for the 7 flyable models . , 
.'L'1ot"_Qr indica'tion of lo'1ht t can be accomplished by selectivity 
combi~"'Qd "'lith persistent attcnt: 0-, ,to deta.il hns been provided by 
the ..?l"Ogr'ar,;t devised by the Ail' :E 0 CQ and the Z\.crODp:lCe COl."poration 
for selection and pre parotic .1 of the Atlas booster:::; ror r;ur.ncc1 
ccognizing ti l ~t ~jor design chan~s to incr~asQ 
rcCi~:'-;;.;..J. inVI lV0.d 1:1 r£!{! parts, n Co .yonent Selection Program, a 
I:',·c ... ·!'\~~y 'ollou"- In'''''p'''''c~-~ r ....... P""'OCf'.u: :-"T1'~ =-. _ _ p,~. ~rr'h{· (.~ •. f"~ .......... ' R"'v,rc'" Pro .. (.0. /.-'-' _ ... = '"' c.. ...... ~ <J- ' , ___ ••.• ~l'" o_ ... _ .... ~ ....... w 
------
a:1't..., ']Cr" sc ·I..:cned. These 'tl esc p "ior history and pe~"formance under 
:n -::: c :::::~.:"'J~j 1"-.)11 '"fut .illSI ect:1on prQgra.':1 technicel tcn.nlS of 
11.:"'_ Fo:..'cc· :md .t_~ro~Dace ~:-(I?cr'l:S on each booot:el. ... subsY3tem \>JCl."'e set 
11[' -::0 l";:'!vicH the manufuctm"'5..ng 1 is "Cory ai1.d factory tC"'ts 0:'; each 
!'~-:;:,cu:::;,y bo",::;i::~ to VG1"ify and .ex rtify its mlitubility for r..anned 
:!!. 1.:h.C! fli~h·t cnfcty rcv.:i..ev program similar technico.l tcar::s 
\:Cl'C ol'::;~Ln:!.;~ed. at the lm.mch ~ ,i t = to moni tel' und l~ccord the per-
:':C:"'::<Z1CC of ~c.ch Dubsystc-m th!'ol: ;~lout all preflight prepc.rntlons 
Q.nd chC!ckout actlvit5,cs . • hc~e tCUr.iS reported to n sClllor !'CViC'I!l 
ho£.1:':0. ~mI'tcd \'Ji-'ch the finsl l'e3 }orlZibili ty fot" :revie\\1i.ng all the 
p::'o"iJlo::1s una. c:.ctions pCl"tincnt t:) the booster m~d certifying tho:!: 2 
\·Jit1t5 .. 1 -ellC li.1tits of hUl'!U! fu'"1C\ll :!d!3C) it t'ms rco.dy for manned 
/'..;:, n rGsult of 'this prozrrur., the Mercury boo~tel'S helve rc-
qu.ircd i.::J:!.cc the nOl"mo.l m:ll1-hCUl'; to fabricate 11 and have received 
:;10l"<:? 'l.:h<".n th':"2C times tIC? llorn-:u.l checkout time and attention. '('!hi Ie 
no l1"k1.!"! ero :::ny that thin fOl.'T.1UIa 5.nsurcs success, it certainly dens 
!lO':; invite f::..i.lurc . 
~n -:': .. , CQ,sc of the spn.cccru:1:, "-1e have follot~ed a ~encrLllly 
ci-:::lilnl" D.!?!}:t'onch J!S 1:' ~ ":~l"dn te:!h: dcal survcil1.:ulce onu rovlC'l.\1 of 
Gl.~bsycti:;:!·11 DC!!'..:ormn.ncc. S'pcc~l<:ll 'lnpho.sis has been placcd on m..::dn- . 
t~:ln::nz u l?ax-tlcul~ ly hi~h leve.. of tcc.."hnicnl co.pnbili 1.-y at the 
8 
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Vel"Y t~101'OU{ 11 investigations of every syml?ton 
C!"! .u;.oi: DC! C;) .•. uttc.::l to flight wi- ile IDlY oJ.n~~l'""cd difficulty rcr.m.ino 
t::1 .... "-::'.:cn"::ion of "the best CJl..ill-if icd "technicul -talent ilv3ilablc on 
-che 'I.e -called cnc;i.necrL"13 probler: 3 of each ve ilicle. Sir.tilar pro-
ccilurcs ~:ill be follm17cd in 01..I' [u"ture programs . 
I"1 the dcsisn und te~1"tine: a .:'cas out" approach to -the rclin-
'1.i.:"':',:y v.ml fli.~i1t u<1fc-ty problem ulso l"Cflcc-tc lccsol1s learned in 
0C -'cpa P:::'OVi3ionc ~ \.'c :"'Cco(3i1izc :hut the most effective apPl.'oilch r 
to ::mfci:y is thl:o"zh vehicle red ~ubili·ty . 
':..:'0 l!' ... :n_.rc -th:rt Lde~te n tt .!l1tion is directed to rel'::abili ty 
c~mll , fOi' the spacecr.:1ft ~ This 0' 'crall gael is sub",cqucmtly budgetcd 
-----_.-------
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:,~,",::i.::bllity i ...:.ll·ovcl:1cnt r.cUGll~ that should be inc01."'pOI'ated in 
lO.t.'r.c.lly .i11ch1<!c only t1 e so- called ra.ndol. or sta.tisticcl 
<c. ':"sys-1:c .. t:!1\. ~pac::!craft relit bj lit)' v.:lIlK!s derived in this way 
- e::' '::0 !. 'fl::!ct the r.-.inirrn.un fail ure rate tU\1t !l1.!ly ultimately be 
of design errora, i nteruct:!,ol cf-
~;cctc 1:c:i"1,ccn par-ts and Cor,<!pOLCT ts t unanl.icinutcd enviromncntnl 
':.!Z:: <:s, 0'" et'r{)r~ in <:!Gtir..:J.t.:L: .. S] "Il'ViY'Olll.nts . Virtunlly all of 
. , .. J, fli.g! t: dlf1''::'culti<:!3 -to cle:l:c ;'lye been in this subsystem -dcvel-
opr.1ent c;::tc;3o~y. los v. ould _-'1V _ been detectcd end eliminated bc-
fo_ ~ flisht ::-- t c g ... ound test t.!c l1uques and progI'ams thc:rt were 
Lt- ti:. i.:.C!~y dEvised _·d b en (lvill able c.t thilt ti.lIlE . l"lS u result 
0"': . ... ::L1.8 c~'J?c:,"'icncc ~ -~ D.l"C .LCI1d.11~ to concenti. .. .1.te r.ruch of out' l"C-
1:;:;1)':::1:i:t..;,' cffo_ t on dcv::'si s; sub ;./S1:0 test progrc:.ml.'J. that .. Jill detect 
and. 1.ir:'..L :J.tc these avoidable so n 'cc!:J of failure bcfol"'C flieht . 
s':::s...s -~o.r.:t "t .:11 absorb ::he e::(Q.:!c :cd number 0 ~ par-ts failures \-1ith-
_d to layout it tes .oing program tl n. t t· ill 











y; ~,;::;d "puc,,:: Gffoj;,"t is fo'" the k :'m1 of p~ople ,,&,1ho t'lill not permit 
-:'1 e his-to;.:'Y o-!: :?liC;ht -ch2.-;: could 0-'· h.av been ~voic1ed t if oome-
oeen mor~ ex )c:ricnccd, more skillful , nol:'C C :'<:! -
··c:.iclo..:. . t t'li11 p':onec2." the c: ~plorcl.tion of "';:ucc raquircc the 
sc:.. ... v~CCG 0::" h~ I:';ost cCl!nblc g;1d most ex.perienced people ruld COr.l-
"1::0 ......... ~"", 
\'1111 pcrmi no C JD] ro:;ise of the \!:lillli ty essentiul 
people uno 'wi1.l Th::VC!" ovcrloa!c or isnorc the slightest 
cf.rc:..~ t: .... t· co ort-en spells th(! {iffercnce b~tv1ecn success .ond 
Ci",c: lSS:'. u --lll.:J evening re p0j~ht P'" best m.m"n:.:trizcd in the simple 
c;.,~a... . tLc.t le1::.vc:::; tl::.s e:arth 011 hi; mo~t ambitio!s end chullcn~ing 
r'_(~-v,--nJ,:u::'C i 1 hw:. :n hictOlY shaJ.lt'·:?present: the best that dcdicut0d 
cc;t1e ::0:' les5. 
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